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THE BASIS OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
I
If a master choose to give orders to his servant, no one can
fail to understand why he should be held liable for the conse-
quences of their commission.' Nor is the case in substance dif-
ferent when he ratifies his servant's act. To stamp what is done
for him with the seal of his approval is tacitly, but obviously,
to accept the act as his own ;2 and that is true no less where the
ratification is implicit, than where it is expressly made manifest.3
No one, however, deems it necessary to take objection to lia-
bility which is consequent upon a general negligence.4 I may
knowingly employ a clearly incompetent person.' I may con-
sciously fail to provide proper means for the performance of
the allotted work. I may fail to give my servant information
which I know to be essential to the right completion of his task.7
I may fail to take adequate precautions against the commission
of a tort in my presence.8  In cases such as these, where the
master is directly involved, it is essential to any scheme of law
that he should be held liable for such damage as his servant
may cause.
The problem is far different where express authority does not
exist. A state in which it is an accepted doctrine that the sins
of the servant may, even when unauthorized, be visited upon the
master, has won a tolerable respect for its law. Yet the thing
is sufficiently novel to be worth some careful investigation. In
no branch of legal thought are the principles in such sad con-
'Doctor and Student, I, ix; Lucas v. Mason (1875) Io Ex. 251; Smith
v. Keal (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 34o.2 Bishop v. Montague (16oo) Cro. Eliz. II, 824; Padget v. Priest (1787)
2 T. P. 97; Ewbank v. Nutting (1849) 7 C. B. 797; Dempsey v. Chambers
(1891) 154 Mass. 330.
3 Goff v. G. N. R. Co. (1861) 3 E. & E. 672; Walker v. S. E. Ry. Co.
(1870) 5 C. P. 640.
4 Wanstallv. Pooley (1841) 6 C1. & F. gio; Dansey v. Richardson (1854)
3 El. & BI. 144; Cox v. Central Vermont Ry. Co. (1898) 17o Mass. 129.
5 Cutler v. Morrison (igio) 43 Pa. Sup. Ct. 55; Martin v. Richards
(1892) I55 Mass. 381.
6 Mitchell v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co. (1894) 68 N. H. 96.
7 Fletcher v. Baltimore & P. R. R. Co. (1897) 168 U. S. 135.
8 M'Laughlin v. Pryor (842) 4 Man. & G. 58.
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fusion. Nowhere has it been so difficult to win assent to what
some have deemed fundamental dogma.9  Nor is this all. What
principles-even if of a conflicting kind-have yet emerged are
comparatively new in character. They do not go back to that
venerable time when Richard I endowed the Anglo-Saxon race
with legal memory. There is no trace of them in Bracton.
10
The Year-Books do not aid us.11  Coke-it seems marvellous
enough-is silent upon them; or, at any rate, it is a different
tale he has to tell. Our theories come in with the Revolution
of i688, and they bear the impress of a single, vivid personality.
So that if they have a history, it is short enough to raise deep
questions. And, indeed, it must be admitted that the problems
inherent in our principles are very formidable. There is no
field of law into which they do not seem to enter. Contract, tort,
negilgence-in all of these they have their word to say, and it
is a word of growing import for our time.2 The age has passed
when each man might bear untroubled the burden of his own
life; to-day, the complexities of social organization seem, too
often, to have cast us, like some Old Man of the Sea, upon the
shoulders of our fellows. Where, above all the men of Mediaeval
England gloried in their own labor, we, or, at least, many of
us, take pleasure in dividends that have been vicariously earned.
It is an age of abundant service. Vast numbers are working
for other men and obeying their commands. Service implies
action. A tells B to perform some work. When B's work entails
loss to C, what is the relation of A to the transaction? We
have maxims and to spare upon this question. Respondeat
superior is an argument which, like David, has slain its tens of
thousands. Its seeming simplicity conceals in fact a veritable
hornet's nest of stinging difficulties. It is the merest dogma,
9 See Mr. Baty's fierce attack in his brilliant, if perverse, Vicarious
Liability (I915). Dean Thayer in the posthumous paper published in
29 -ABv. L. REv. Soi has suggested sdme interesting possibilities of
future development.
10 Cf. Bracton ff. Iisb, i24b, i58, 7a, i7:2b, 2o4b.
11 Prof. Wigmore in 7 HARv. L. REV. 315 has cited some evidence to the
contrary, but it is hardly decisive. The cases which foreshadow the mod-
ern doctrine are conceived with special duties. Cf. Cowell, Institutes, p.
207; Southern v. Howe, Cro. Jac. 468; Noy, Maxims, chap. xliv. For the
general rule, see Rolle, Abridgment, tit. Action on the Case, pl. 95; Wal-
thain v. Mulgar (16o6) Moore, 776.
12 Cf. Dr. Baty's remark that the modern law is injuring industry,
op. cit. p. 154.
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and in no sense explanation. For while everyone can see that
the master ought to answer for acts he has authorized, why
should he be liable either where no authorization can be shown,
or where express prohibition of an act exists? Latin may bring
us comfort but it will not solve our problems. Nor is the case
improved if we substitute qui facit per alium facit per se in its
place. Like most of its kind that antique legend is simply a
stumbling-block in the pathway of juristic progress. It is one
of those dangerous generalizations which shivers into untruth
upon the approach of fact. Where another does no more than
fulfil your command, you may with accuracy be said to act.
That is as legally clear as it is morally unimpeachable. But what
of cases where your servant performs acts incidental to your
business without express authority for their performance? What
of acts done in positive disobedience to command? Can we be
said actually to have performed acts which at first acquaintance
we are anxious to repudiate? Is Parker, for instance, to suffer
if a subordinate officer, who happens to be a genius, wilfully
disobeys orders, and puts his glass to an unseeing eye.?U What
is to occur when the servant's action is colored by personal
motive? -Clarity, it is obiious, begins now to pale into that
obscurity where what is most visible is the natural confusion of
life. Our vaunted simplicity perishes before the realism of the
event. We have, it is clear, to go further than the jingles of
legal convenience if we are to arrive at a working hypothesis;
unless, indeed, we accept the subtle Pyrrhonisms of a distin-
quished authority, and assume at the outset a fundamental dis-
harmony between reason and law.14
II
We shall be less pessimistic. Our skepticism is the conse-
quence of a too great reliance upon the historic method. We
have laid insistence rather upon the origins of law than upon the
ends it is to serve. 5 When the history of the modem extension
of vicarious liability is examined, no one can question the high
'$Though of course Parker hoped-and felt-that Nelson would dis-
regard his generous caution.
"4 Mr. Justice Holmes in 5 HAxv. L. Rav. 14. Cf. Paley, Moral Philoso-
phy, Bk. III, Pt. I, chap. xi: "These determinations stand, I think, rather
upon the authority of the law than upon any principle of natural justice."
15 Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes' impressive words, io HAuv. L. Rzv. 457 ff.
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degree of its mysteriousness." We may barely guess what
motives underlay the striking and decisive dicta of Chief Justice
Holt in a series of cases, the more difficult, in that they were
not adequately reported,1" but largely gained their strength
from remarks made obiter, and from that vivid imagination
which enabled Lord Holt to suggest compelling analogies."' We
see signs of a struggle with the mediaeval doctrine in the partial
persistence of the old ideas.' 9 Yet, by i8oo, the novelties have
forced their way to acceptance. 20  The rare genius of Willes
and Blackburn makes of them, in some sort, not the least vital
contribution of nineteenth-century jurisprudence to the growth
of Anglo-American law.2 1  It becomes possible to assert that,
special authority apart, the duties assigned to a servant give him
the power to bind his master in such contracts as come within
the scope of his emplyoment. 22  But the law goes further, and
makes the master generally liable for his servant's torts so long
as they are fairly and reasonably to be traced to his service 
;2"
though no burden is thrown upon the employer where no such
connection can be shown.2" When the act committed is a crime,
16 See Dean Wigmore in 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Law, 474.
'7 Cf. Mr. Baty's remarks, op. cit. 23-4.
18 Turberville v. Stampe (1697) Com. 459, 1 Salk. 13, Ld. Raym. 264;
Middleton v. Fowler (1699) 1 Salk. 282; Jones v. Hart (1699) 2 Salk.
441, Ld. Raym. 736; Lane v. Cotton (7o) 12 Mod. 489; Hern v. Nichols
(1709) Holt 462, I Salk. 289.
29 Randle v. Deane (1701) 2 Lut. 1496; Naish v. East India Co. (1721)
Com. 421.
20 Cf. the change between Naish and Bush v. Steinman (I799) I B. & P.
4o4. Blackstone in i Comm. 429 is suggestive for the trend of opinion
towards the middle of the century.
21 The fundamental cases are. Seymour v. Greenwood (i86o) 6 H. & N.
359; (86) 7 ibid. 355; Goff v. G. N. R. Co. (186I) 3 E. & E. 672;
Limpus v. Gen. Omnibus Co. (1867) I H. & C. 526; Barwick v. Joint
Stock Bank (1867) 2 Ex. 259; Poulton v. L. & S. W. R. Co. (1867) 2
Q. B. D. 534.
22 See Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium, i2ob; Doctor and Student, II, xlii;
Noy, Maxims, p. 58; Nickson v. Brohan (171o) IO Mod. iio; Hibbs v.
Ross (1866) 1 Q. B. D. 534; Watteau v. Fenwick Co. (1892) 67 L. T. N. S.
831; Langan v. G. W. Ry. Co. (1874) 30 L. T. N. S. 173, especially the
remarks of Bramwell, B.
23 Limpus v. Gen. Omnibus Co., ut supra; Stevens v. Woodward (1881)
5o L. J. (Q. B.) 231; Dyer v. Munday [1895] 1 Q. B. 742.
"4McManus v. Crickett (18oo) i East, io6; Croft v. Alison (1821) 4
B. & Aid. 590; Stevens v. Woodward, ut supra, 318; Allen v. L. & S.
W. R. (187o) 6 Q. B. D. 65; Abrahams v. Deakin [I8gI] i Q. B. 516.
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authorization, important statutory exceptions apart, is still neces-
sary; for the law still places motive at the basis of criminal
liability.25 Yet, even when these limitations are considered, the
scope-as Jessel thought too vast 2 -- of this extension is indeed
remarkable. Almost within a century the doctrines of hallowed
antiquity are reversed. No attention, as it seems, is paid to
historic antecedent. The whole change is, so one may urge,
outstanding proof of the oft-controverted fact that judges can
and do make law. Clearly, good reason is essential for so strik-
ing a revolution of opinion.
Here is the crux of the problem; for it must be admitted,
that so far in legal theory if we have a multiplicity of theories,
none has brought widespread satisfaction. Some, indeed, are
frankly impossible. It is not very helpful to be told by authority
so distinguished as Parke, 27 as Alderson,28 as Cranworth, 29 that
qui facit per odium is the basis of the liability; for, as we have
seen, that, in strict fact, can be true only where the master's
assent is proved. The quasi-scientific mind of Lord Brougham
ascribed the doctrine to the fact that "by employing him, I set
the whole thing in motion, and what he does, being done for
my benefit, and under my direction, I am responsible for the
consequences of doing it '"3 0-a niggardly determinism which,
from its concealed fictions, serves only to darken counsel; and
it has the additional demerit of being logically as extensible
to the work of an independent contractor, where vicarious lia-
bility does not ordinarily apply, as to that of a servant, or agent
where it does. Mr. Justice Willes, of whose opinion Mr. Baty
seems to approve,31 grounds our dogma on the fact that "there
ought to be a remedy against some person capable of paying
damages to those injured."3 2 But it is clear that if this is the path
2
5R. v. Huggins (730) 2 Str. 882; Bagge v. Whitehead [1892] 2 Q. B.
355.26 SInith v. Keal (1882) 9 Q. B. D. 35r.
27 Quartnan v. Burnett (840) 6 M. & W. 509.
28 iIutchison v. York, Newcastle Ry. Co. (0850) 5 Ex. 343.
29 Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid (1858) 3 Macq. 266.
3 0 Duncan vz. Finlater (i839) CI. & F. 894, 9io. I ought to add that this
theory seems to command the assent of Dean Wigmore, 3 Select Essays
in Anglo-American Law, 536. See Parke's criticism of it in Quarman v.
Burnett, ut supra.
81 Baty, op. cit. p. 154.
s2 Limpus v. Gen. Omnibus Co., ut supra. One has a troubled feeling
that Maitland might have endorsed this dictum, 2 P. & M. 533.
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the law ought, as a general rule, to follow, it is going to have
small concern with justice. The great Pothier ascribed its force
to the necessity of making men careful in the selection of their
servants ;33 yet it is clear that in the vast majority of cases that
have arisen, no such negligence has ever been alleged. Nor will
anyone dream to-day of accepting the view of the unctuous
Bacon, that the liability arises from our failure to do our own
work-a failure permitted by an indulgent law on the condition
that we bear an absolute responsibility for such delegation.
3 '
Sir Frederick Pollock-with far more reason-urges that as
all business is a dangerous enterprise, boldness must pay its
price.3  The "implied command" theory has nothing rational
about it; it is one of those dangerous and disagreeable fictions
which persist as a method from a primitive stage of law.
38 And
Maitland has slain the equally hopeless fiction of an imaginary
identification of master and servant derived from the jurispru-
dence of Rome.3 7  Nor is the opinion of Lord Holt-which
derives a special importance from its historical setting-in any
way more adequate. It seemed to him simply a principle of
natural justice that where one of two innocent persons must suf-
fer through the fraud of a third, the suffering must be borne
by the master who, in employing that third party, enabled the
fraud to be committed.3 8  The view is little more than that later
adumbrated by Lord Brougham, though it is more plausibly
arrayed. All torts are not deceits, and it would be difficult, for
example, to apply such a test to the situation in Lunt v. North-
Western Ry. Co., where the defendant's gatekeeper invited the
plaintiff in entire good faith to pass over a railway crossing,
9
or where a tramway conductor honestly, but mistakenly, sus-
pects a passenger of tendering a counterfeit half-sovereign, and
33 Pothier, Obligations (trans. Evans) p. 72.
34Abridgment (ed. 1832), tit. Master and Servant (K.) iv. 336.
35 See his paper on Employer's Liability in his Essays on Jurisprudence
and Ethics.
36 Below, sec. IV.
3T P. & M. II, 530. I say this with deep respect, for Mr. Justice Holmes
has given his weighty support to this theory, 4 HAuv. L. REv. 345-64, and
5 HAzv. L. Rav. 1-23; but as Wigmore (op. cit. 533 n. I.) has pointed out,
his illustrations are mainly derived from West, Symboleography of which
the relation to the civil law makes it at once suspect.
88 In Hern v. Nichols, ut supra.
39 (I866) L. R. i Q. B. 277.
IIO
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gives him in charge.40  Lord Bramwell gave up the law alto-
gether. "I have never been able," he told the Parliamentary
Committee of 1876,4 ' "to see why the law should be so-why a
man should be liable for the negligence of his servant, there
being no relation constituted between him and the party com-
plaining." Nor did Mr. Justice Wright attempt any explanation
of the law beyond its universality.
42
II
That universality is notable. The law of a business world is
not made for amusement. Some solid reality there must have
been in the reasons for its acceptance; and its very persistence
in the face of bitter criticism is itself suggestive. We make men
pay for faults they have not committed. It seems, on the surface,
extraordinary enough; unless, indeed, we are to conclude with
Lord Bramwell that the whole thing is nonsensical, or with Sir
Frederick Pollock that it is the entrance-fee payable for admis-
sion to a dangerous trade. But the rules of law have usually
some purpose behind them. Men like Holt and Blackburn are
something more than whimsical innovators.42  The basis of our
principles is to be found in the economic conditions of the time.
Business has ceased to be mere matter of private concern. A
man who embarks upon commercial enterprise is something
more--even in the eyes of the law 4 4-- than a gay adventurer in
search of a fortune. The results of his speculation are bound
to affect the public; and the state, as the guardian of its inter-
ests, is compelled to lay down conditions upon which he may
pursue his profession. The emphasis does not lie, as Sir F.
Pollock has suggested, in an ipso facto danger in business, but
in the removal of certain zones of fact without the sphere of
ordinary litigation. The basis of the rule, in fact, is public policy.
One knows, of course, that "public policy" is a doctrine for
which the judges have cherished no special affection. "I, for
40 Furlong v. South London Tramways Co. (1884) 4 J. P. 329; cf.
Charleston v. London Tramways Co. (1888) 4 T. L. R. 629.
4: (1887) Cd. 285, p. 46.
4 2 Baty, op. cit. p. i5o. For a valuable general commentary on the ten-
tencies of the modern law, cf. Charmont, Les Transformations du droit
civil, chap. xvi.
43 I hope to trace in a later paper the early history of respondeat superior.
44 Cf. Mr. E. A. Adler's stimulating papers in 28 and 29 HARv. L. Rxv.
III
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one," said Burrough, J.,45 "protest . . . . against arguing
too strongly upon public policy; it is a very unruly horse, and
when you get astride it, you never know where it will carry
you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is never argued
upon at all but when other points fail." But such an attitude
is, in truth, but the prophetic anticipation of the Victorian dis-
trust of governmental interference. It is becoming more and
more clear that we may not be content with an individualistic
commercial law.49 Just as that individualism was the natural
reaction from the too strict and local paternalism of mediaeval
policy-perhaps aided by the inherent self-centredness of
Puritan thought'--so we are compelled to turn away from
every conception of the business relation which does not see
the public as an effective, if silent, partner in every enterprise.
That is the real meaning of Factory and Employers' Liability Acts
as of compulsory education, and the establishment of a minimum
wage. It is simply a legal attempt to see the individual in his
social context. That, at which we industrially aim, is the maxi-
mum public good as we see it. In that respect, the employer is
himself no more than a public servant, to whom, for special
purposes, a certain additional freedom of action, and therefore
a greater measure of responsibility, has been vouchsafed.
48  If
that employer is compelled to bear the burden of his servant's
torts even when he is himself personally without fault, it is
because in a social distribution of profit and loss, the balance of
least disturbance seems thereby best to be obtained.
49
4SRichardson v. Mellish (i824) 2 Bing. 252; cf. Wallis v. Smith (1882)
21 Ch. D. per Jessel at p. 266; Rex. v. Hampden (1637) 3 S. T. 1293;
Wilkes' Case (1768) i9 S. T. 1112 per Mansfield, C. J.; and above all
Egerton v. Brownlow (1853) 4 H. L. C. i per Pollock, C. B.
46 See the striking remarks of Mr. Justice Holmes in 1o HARv. L. REv.
457, 467, and his speech to the Harvard Law Review Association on
Feb. 15, 1913, in Speeches (1913) pp. 98-1o2; above all, his remarks in
Lochner v. N. Y. (19o4) 198 U. S. 45, 75-6.
47 See Levy, Economic Liberalism, passim, and the last chapter of Gooch,
Political Thought frotin Bacon to Halifax. For the way in which state
regulation has become essential, cf. Pic, Legislation Industrielle (igo8)
chaps. ii and iii.
48 Cf. Duguit, Transformations du Droit Public, especially chaps. ii
and vii.
49 Cf. the remarks of M. Sainchelette in his Responsabilit de la Garantie,
p. I24: La responsibiliti du fait d'autrui n'est pas une fiction inventie par
la loi positive. C'est une exigence de l'ordre social.
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What, then, we have to ask of ourselves is whether the posi-
tive benefits to be derived from the present rule do not in fact
outweigh the hardships it may on occasion inflict. We cannot
run a human world on the principles of formal logic. The test
of our rule's worth must, in fact, be purely empirical in char-
acter. We have to study the social consequences of its applica-
tion, and deduce therefrom its logic. We have to search for
the mechanism of our law in life as it actually is, rather than
fit the life we live to a priori rules of rigid legal system.50 The
way in which the modem conception has grown is, in fact, very
comparable to the method by which special liabilities are attached
to innkeepers,5 ' to those who have wild animals,5 2 to those who
start a fire,5 3 to those who engage as public carriers.5 ' The
meaning of the legal sword of Damocles forged for their
penalization is rightly to be found, not in the particular relation
they bear to their charge, but in the general relation to society
into which their occupation brings them. In such an aspect as
this it may be urged that Holt found good reason for the
incisive certitude of his dicta in an age which saw so enormous
a growth of corporate enterprise. It was, says Dean Wigmore,5
"a conscious effort to adjust the rule of law to the expediency
of mercantile affairs." Something of this, it may be urged, was
perceived by Bentham in a passage which has not perhaps
received its due meed of attention. "The obligation imposed
upon the master," he says,"8 "acts as a punishment, and dimin-
ishes the chances of similar misfortunes. He is interested in
knowing the character, and watching over the conduct of them
50 What we have in fact to work out for vicarious liability are the prin-
ciples indicated by Dean Pound in his various papers, especially in 5
COL. L. Rav. 339; 8 ibid. 6o5; 24 H Av. L. REv. 59'; 25 ibid. 489. A good
instance of such application is Prof. Frankfurter's paper in 29 HAV. L.
REv. 353.
51 This social conception is interestingly prominent in the judgment of
Crompton, J., in Avards v. Dance (1862) 26 J. P. 437.
52 Fletcher v. Rylands (1866) I Ex. 265, 3 H. L. 330; and see thereon
the comment of Dean Thayer in the article cited above.
53 Jones v. Festiniog Ry. Co. (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 733.
54 Holmes, Common Law, chap. v. and Beale in 3 Anglo-American Legal
Essays, 148.
5 Op. cit. iii, 536. Anyone who reads Professor Scott's History of Joint-
Stock Companies to i72o will realize the force of this distum.
56 Collected Works, i, 383. The passage occurs in his Principles of
Penal Law.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
for whom he is answerable. The law makes him an inspector
of police, a domestic magistrate, by rendering him liable for
their imprudence." Even when we allow for the curiosities
of the author's characteristic phraseology, it is yet clear that
he has seized upon an important truth. If we allow the master
to be careless of his servant's torts we lose hold upon the most
valuable check in the conduct of social life.
The real problem in vicarious liability, in fact, is not so much
the rectitude of its basal principles, as the degree in which they
are to be applied.5 7  Nor can we anticipate the manner in which
that problem is to be solved. What must strike the observer in
the study of the cases is that each is in itself a separate issue;
the employer of a railway conductor whose habit it is to kiss
the female passengers of pleasing appearance 8 must be dealt
with differently from a bank of which the cashier fraudulently
induces a customer to accept certain bills." "Each case," says
Professor Frankfurter," "must be determined by the facts
relevant to it . . . . we are dealing, in truth, not with a
question of law but with the application of an undisputed formula
to a constantly changing and growing variety of economic and
social facts. Each case, therefore, calls for a new and distinct
consideration, not only of the general facts of industry, but
of -the specific facts in regard to the employment in question."
The issue in vicarious liability is not different from that in regard
to labor legislation. Just as our conception of the constitution-
alty of statutes will depend upon the contemporary interpreta-
tion of liberty,61 so the content of the liability enforced at any
given moment upon a master for his servant's torts, must be
shifted to fit the new facts it will continually encounter. It is
not a very serious objection, in this age when incorporation has
become but a formal informality, to urge that the growth of the
57 Cf. Prof. Frankfurter's remarks in regard to labor legislation, 29
HARv. L. REv. 367.
58 Croaker v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 17 Am. Rep. 5o4.
59 Mackay v. Com. Bank of N. B. (1874) L. R. 5 P. C. 394.
60 Op. cit. p. 369.
61 Cf. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YA.E LAW JouRNAL, 48o, and the
argument of Prof. Frankfurter in Bunting v. Oregon (i916) reprinted
by the National Consumers' League in The Case for the Shorter Work-
day, pp. ix-xv. See also the opinion in Holden v. Hardy (z897) 169
U. S. 366, and the admirable remarks of M. Pic, op. cit. pp. 543-9. They
are concepts exactly similar to these which I believe to lie at the base of
vicarious liability.
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doctrine is a dangerous blow aimed at the stability of property.6 2
The doctrine will grow or contract according as the facts to
which it is applied seem to warrant growth or contraction. It
will have in view, not the history that is to be justified, but the
end that is to be attained. It will let the future take care of
itself by protecting it against the invasion of dogmas which
grow painfully antique. It will strive, in fact, to make elastic
that bed of Procrustes in which the client of law too often takes
his rest. If, as Best, C. J., remarked,68 our law is to be "bot-
tomed on plain, broad principles," it is well to see that they
do not also, even though unconsciously, include its superstructure.
For each age has to begin anew its legal thinking.
IV
The problem of scope of employment6V4 has become largely
confused by the efforts of the courts to provide, somehow or
other, a test of negligence on the part of the master. Thus, mas-
ters are to be held liable for their servant's torts when the latter
are acting "for the master's benefit"6' 5 when, as seems to be
assumed, he is less careful than we may demand-or in such
wise that a probable authority would from the nature of the case
have been given 6 6 -a fiction of implied command being, so far
as one can see, relied upon.6 7  It seems far easier to attempt a
humanist application of public policy to the problems presented
by the cases. The fiction of implied authority is so constantly
breaking down, it so obviously results in patent anomalies as
to be as dangerous as it is unsatisfactory. When we have defined
"scope of employment" as consisting in acts incidental or
natural to the servant's occupation, we are only on the threshold
of our difficulties. For there has been the most widespread
divergence of opinion as to what comes within the scope of
62 Baty, op. cit. 165.
68 Strother v. Barr (1828) 5 Bing. 136, 153.
64 Mr. Baty, in chaps. v-vii of his Vicarious Liability, has provided a per-
fect mine of admirable comment on the cases, to which I am greatly
indebted-though it is to be remembered that he enters always from the
standpoint of a complete disagreement with the modern law.
05 Barwick v. Eng. Joint Stock Bank, ut supra; Dyer v. Munday, ut
supra.
.66Atty. Gen. v. Siddon & Binns (183o) i Tyr. 41.
67 For a vigorous dissent from this attitude, see the remarks of Brain-
well, B., in Wier v. Bell (877) 3 Ex. D. 238.
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such acts, and no statistical measurement is at all possible. It
is clear enough that if a driver employed by a jobmaster fails
to keep watch over his customer's goods, that the master ought
to pay; for he has held out the servant as capable in the per-
formance of his duties-an obtainment of trust which carries
with it a burden of responsibility.8 But when we explain the
decision as based on negligence-after all, a fiction so far as the
master is concerned-we have in reality advanced nowhere; for
the negligence is that of the servant and the problem is the
liability of the master. It surely seems better to emphasize the
fact that public policy obviously requires a means of forcing
masters to keep continual watch over the conduct of their ser-
vants, and it is difficult to see how that end would otherwise be
attained. Nor is it difficult to understand why a bank should
be held answerable for the faults of its manager.6 9 From one
point of view, and that the orthodox, it is, of course, possible
to attribute the decision in Barwick to an "implied authority"
on the part of the manager to act on behalf of his bank; but in
a wider aspect it is clear, that where loss must occur, more good
is likely to accrue from making a bank liable for a mistaken
appointment, than from making a corn-dealer suffer for a not
unnatural reliance on managerial dignity. The fiction is surely
unsatisfactory; for it is hardly possible to suppose that the bank
gave its servant authority to act dishonestly. It is surely better
to explain the ground of the decision as an attempt to calculate
the minimum social loss in a social situation where some loss is
inevitable. So too, if a teacher renders her employers liable
for an unwise treatment of her charges, 70 it is not because it
is part of her duty to act in such fashion as gives rise to pen-
alization, but because the fact of her liability is more likely to
prevent the recurrence of the act, than the argument that she
was acting for her own benefit and therefore outside her author-
ity; for no child is, on the whole, likely to be deterred from
poking a fire at command by the consideration that a court might
declare the order outside the implied authority of the teacher.
We do not therefore attempt the definition of the doctrine of
implied authority for the simple reason that definition is impos-
sible. We give up the doctrine. It is impossible, for instance,
6sAbraham v. Bullock (igoi) 86 L. T. 796.
9 Barwick v. Eng. Joint Stock Bank, ut supra.
70 Smith v. Martin [1911] 2 IC B. 775.
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to say just when the occupation of a carter gives him implied
authority to make a deviation, and at what point his journey
becomes completely independent.
7 1  A "small d&our" must
obviously be relative to the day's journey, and it would be inter-
esting to know exactly upon what principles the courts would
be prepared to fix the proportion. Nor is the task at all easier
when the court refuses to consider the object the servant had
in mind when he committed the tort. The manager of a saloon,
for instance, is not usually sportively inclined to give his barman
in charge (as it turns out erroneously) ;73 and to declare that,
because in fact the property he was suspected of stealing was
safe, the manager could have no authority to act, is straining the
bonds of common sense. An authority to have entire control is,
in any rational aspect, an authority to act as best seems to fit
the cirmustances, and if the measures taken to that end are mis-
taken, it is yet difficult to see exactly why the master should
avoid the liability for the mistake." Into what complications this
system of delimination may lead in any tangled issue, the well-
known case of Owston v. Bank of New South Wales
5 made
very obvious.
It may also mistake the clear demands of humanity. A milk-
cart was involved in an accident, in the course of which a
milk-boy was injured. A bystander offered her assistance to
the driver in order to see the boy home safely. The cart started
before she was properly settled in it, and she was injured by
being thrown out.7 It seems clear that the driver was acting
on the socially admirable ground of ordinary human kindness;
and it was not unreasonable, therefore, to expect his employers
to be responsible. The court, however, took up an entirely dif-
ferent attitude. Cox v. Midland Counties Ry. Co.
77 decided that
a station master cannot bind his company for any surgeon's fees
71 Cf. Whatman v. Pearson (1868) L. R. 3 C. P. 422 with Joel v. Morri-
son (1834) 6 C. & P. 5oi; and Patten v. Rea (857) 2 C. B. N. S. 6o6
with Cormnack v. Digby (1876) 9 Ir. R. C. L. 567. See also the remarkable
issue in Smith v. Spitz (1892) 156 Mass. 319.
72 See Parke, B., in Whatman v. Pearson, ut supra.
73 Hanson v. Waller [igoi] I K. B. 390.
74 Bowler v. O'Connell (1894) 162 Mass. 319; Fogg v. Boston & L.
R. R. Co. (i889) 148 Mass. 513; Brown v. Jarvis Engineering Co. (z896)
i66 Mass. 75.
7 (1879) 4 A. C. 27o.
76 Houghton v. Pilkington [1912] 3 K. B. 308.
77 (849) 3 Ex. 268.
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whom the former may summon; and it was, therefore, held by
analogy that the acceptance of help by the driver was outside
his implied authority. It is good law that a tramway-conductor
who too forcibly ejects a passenger renders his company liable
in damages ;78 if this occurs on a lonely road, cannot a surgeon's
services be requisitioned save at the conductor's personal
expense? Such reasoning is surely too pedantic to admit of
acceptance. Nor can we place much faith in such a case as
Riddel v. Glasgow0 which apparently gives a rate-collector the
choice between being disowned if he performs his duty efficiently,
and being dismissed if he does not. The connotation of every
such case ought surely to be the human circumstances in which
it occurs. We are beyond that stage of strict law where men are
bound by an empty formalism.
The case is more difficult when ethical defect in the servant's
motive is the determining factor in his tort, or where he delib-
erately breaks his master's command. Here the modem doctrine
is very new indeed, for as late as i8oo it was not admitted that
wilful tort could be within the scope of employment.8 0  Parke
was very anxious to limit the liability of an employer to cases
where negligence could be actually shown."' The origin of the
new rule seems to have been the growth of corporate enter-
prise ;82 and with the classic judgment of Willes in Limpus v.
General Omnibus Co. it became firmly established. 3  Its prin-
ciple, in truth, is sufficiently clear. The London General Omni-
bus Company had given printed orders to its drivers not to in-
terfere with the vehicles of competing companies. The order
was wilfully disobeyed, and yet judgment was given against the
company. The driver, as Willes pointed out, "was employed
not only to drive the omnibus, but also to get as much money as
he could for his master, and to do it in rivalry with other omni-
buses on the road. The act of driving as he did is not incon-
sistent with his employment, when explained by his desire to
78 Seymour v. Greenwood (186o) 6 H. & N. 359 (1862) i ibid. 355.
79 [I910] S. C. 693; [1911] A. C. 209.
8 0
McManus v. Crickett (i8oo) i East, io6.
81 Sharrod v. L. N. W. R. Co. (1849) 4 Ex. 585; and see the judgment
of Bramwell, L. J., in Weir v. Bell, ut supra.
82 Cf. Baty, op. cit. p. 8s.
83 Ut supra; cf. also, Ward v. Gen. Omnibus Co. (1873) 42 L. J. (C. P.)
265; Pittsburgh C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Kirk (I885) io2 Ind. 399.
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get before the other omnibus." He was in no way disturbed
by the company's instructions. He pointed out how easy it
would be to issue secret orders countermanding them, and for
the master thus both to benefit himself, and to keep on the right
side of the law.8" That, surely, is a very necessary and valuable
limitation; for were the law otherwise, there would be a posi-
tive incentive to employers to use their humble servants as the
screen for their wrongdoing. The social object of prevention
can only be obtained by an effective and thoroughgoing
penalization.
The case is similar when trespass becomes extended to fraud.
5
The attempt to discredit the change on the ground that fraud
implies a state of mind on the part of the defendant which does
not in fact exist,( misses the significant point, that in no case
of vicarious liability is moral blame attached to the master. Lia-
bility for wrongful arrest is equally clear; for it is obvious
that the action is entirely consistent with the scope of the ser-
vant's employment unless fiction is to be invoked,
7 and unless
we are to be without means for protecting the public from
needless suffering. 8 It is clearly simply a social -interpretation
of negligence. Because a servant does things in the stress of
the moment which judicial reflection deems to have been actually
unnecessary, there is no reason why the act should not bear
its full consequences. One regrets the continual use of the fic-
tion of "implied authority;"'
' 9 but that is no reason why the
necessity of the rule should not lead to the discussion of what
other reasons may be given for its usage. To narrow liability
by considering authority actually expressed is to endanger very
84 Ibid. at p. 539; cf. also McClung v. Dearborne (i89o) i34 Pa. 396.
s5 As in Barwick.
86 See the remarks of Bramwell, L. J., in Weir v. Bell, ut supra: "I
do not understand legal fraud; to my mind it has no more meaning than
legal heat or legal cold, legal light or legal shade." But MacKay v. Com.
Bank of N. B. (1874) 5 P. C. 394; Swift v. Winterbothan (1873) L. R.
8 Q. B. 244; Brit. Mutual Bank v. Charnwood Forest Ry. Co. (1887) 18
Q. B. D. 714 have established it firmly. See also Pollock, Torts (6th ed.)
p. 92 n. d.
87 Moore v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1872) 8 Q. B. D. 36; Goff v. G. N.
R. Co., ut supra.
88 I have discussed below the unfortunate limitation of this doctrine
through the misapplication of ultra vires.
89 Mr. Baty in the fifth chapter of his book is able to exploit this weak-
ness with great effect.
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seriously our control of social life.90 The employment of a ser-
vant to perform certain functions must, on the whole, mean his
employment to perform them as he deems best fitted, in his inter-
pretation of his instructions, to serve his master's interest. 1 It
is not much consolation to an injured plaintiff to be told that the
defendant meant him no harm; for, as Brian, C. J., said more
than four hundred years ago, the courts do not try the thoughts
of men.2  We have here, as elsewhere, to follow the broad rule
laid down by Shaw, C. J., in a famous case. "This rule," he
said,93 "is obviously founded on the great principle of social
duty, that every man in the management of his own affairs,
whether by himself, or by his agents, shall so conduct them
as not to injure another; and if he does not, and another thereby
sustains damage, he shall answer for it." Nor has the applica-
tion of the rule shown it to be without justification.
And, after all, where the master most needs protection, he
obtains it. He is not liable for the acts of his servant which
are shown to be clearly unconnected with his service.9  N1
master, for example, can possibly warrant the moral impec-
cability of his servants; and it is not difficult to see why
Collins, M. R., should have held that when a servant has in
view objects demonstrably and entirely his own, he should, in
committing his tort, "have severed his connection with his
master, and become a stranger." '9 5 The phrase is not perhaps
of the happiest; it carries the crutch of fiction to sustain it.
But everyone can see that it would not be right to hold a master
liable for the chance temptations to which an usually reputed
00 In Lowe v. G. N. Ry. Co. (1893) 62 L. J. (Q. B.) 524. Matthew and
Wright, J. J., really take this ground. It is the "must" of a railway por-
ter's position that they consider.
91 Cf. Furlong v. South London Tram. Co. (1884) I Cab. and E. 36.
92 y. B. 17 E. IV. I.
93 See Farwell v. Boston and Worcester R. R. Co. (842) 4 Met. (Mass.)
49; and see the admirable remarks of Esher, M. K., in Dyer v. Munday,.
ut supra at p. 746, where he points out the real meaning of the term
authority. Snee v. Trice (18o2) 2 Bay (S. C.) 345 is an interesting ex-
ample of how a special social situation will enable the master to escape
responsibility.
94 McManus v. Crickett, ut supra; Croft v. Alison (1821) 4 B. & Aid.
59o; Hoar v. Maine Central R. R. Co. (188o) 70 Me. 65; Garvey v.
Dung (1866) 30 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 315; Driscoll v. Scranton (1896) 165
Mass. 348; Pittsburgh F. W. & C. Ry. Co. v. Maurer (1871) 21 Oh.
St. 421.
95 Cheshire v. Bailey [i9o5] I K. B. 237 at p. 241.
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honest employee might succumb-the more so as the temptation
is rather the creation of the third party than his own. It may
even be suggested that, in this respect, the master has been
unduly protected; for when a train conductor hits a boy for
jumping on his car, he is doing what he believes to be for his
employer's good, and ought duly to make him liable. 98 To use
a supposed sudden cessation of authority at the moment when
the conductor's unlawful hand descends upon its victim's ear
is to strain rationality to the breaking-point. Mr. Baty com-
plains97 that a consideration of the servant's motive ought alone
to be sufficient to save his master from liability. But the truth
here is that everything must depend on the surrounding cir-
cumstances of the cases with which the courts are called upon
to deal. The reliance to be placed upon a coachman,9 8 for
instance, is different in character from the reliance usually to
be placed upon a bank manager,99 and it is reasonable that a
distinction should be made between them; and what is true of
a bank manager does not, as it seems, apply to a clerk in a com-
pany.100 The rule must wait on the facts.
What is here suggested is the simple thesis that only a social
interpretation of the law will give us a satisfactory clue to the
bewildering labyrinth that confronts us. If the judges continue
to apply general principles founded on a dangerous and unsatis-
fying fiction, only confusion of a lamentable kind can result.
It is hardly possible, as the case now stands, to avoid a perplex-
ing variety of opinion as to whether any given issue comes within
the scope of "implied authority" or not. But it is possible to
have sufficient confidence in the good sense of the courts to ask
for a frankly communal application of the law. The promotion
of social solidarity is an end it is peculiarly incumbent upon the
law to promote, since its own strength, and even life, depends
upon the growth of that sentiment. The fiction of implied
authority is no more than a barbarous relic of individualistic
goRadley v. L. C. C. (913) 29 T. L. R. 68o; cf. Central Ry. Co. v.
Peacock (1888) 69 Md. 257; New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. .opes (18g)
142 U. S. 18.
97 Baty, op. cit. log.
98 As in Cheshire v. Bailey, ut supra.
99 Cont. Bank of N. B., ut supra.
100 Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated [igo6] A. C. 439. See also
Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank (18o) 5 A. C. 317 where the
cases are collected.
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interpretation. It savors too dangerously of the time when the
courts held that they were to do no more than apply a given
remedy to a given set of facts concerning John Doe and Richard
Roe-with a lofty unconcern for the world at large. We are
passing beyond that stage. The meaning to be given to the
scope of employment is bound more and more to affect vitally
the whole future of industry. It is according as lawyers realize
this, that they will be equipped to deal adequately with the facts
of life. It is, it is true, an interpretation they may not find
in the books. But law is perhaps in need of the stimulus of a
freer atmosphere.1 1
V
Such an attitude is the more important when the depersonaliza-
tion of industry is borne in mind. Machinery and corporate enter-
prise have effected a revolution the very beginnings of which
we are able only dimly to conceive. 10 2 The old, intimate relation
between master and servant can hardly now return. The appren-
tice no longer marries his master's daughter, for the simple
reason that his master no longer has a daughter, or, if he does,
that daughter is a corporation who is not given in marriage.
The modern business man is either a director or a manager and
he sees nothing, often enough knows nothing, of his servants.
That is, of course, the natural consequence of the scale of modern
commercial enterprise, but it is a consequence of which the
results need careful emphasis. And alongside this industrial
impersonalism has gone the incredible development of machinery
so that, as Mr. Birrell has grimly noted,10 3 it is with arms and
legs that the courts are largely concerned. Now these corpora-
tions, are, in the eyes even of the law, juristic persons, 04 and
since they act as an ordinary individual would act in a similar
situation, that is to say by agents and servants, it is clearly
reasonable, that they should, equally with individuals, be held
101 Cf. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REv. 12.
102 The reader will find in Mr. Sidney Webb's Towards Social Democracy
(I916) a very brilliant and suggestive sketch of the modern change.
103 See his Law of Employers' Liability, pp. 3-5.
1
0 4 Cf. 29 HARv. L. REV. 404 ff.. The classic treatment of this problem
is to be found in Maitland's famous introduction to his translation of
Gierke's Political Theories of the Middle Age. Generally the fullest and
most brilliant treatment is in Saleilles, La Personnalite Juridique (igio).
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vicariously liable for such acts as those agents and servants may
perform. But it has not proved easy to establish this doctrine
in anything like its necessary completeness. The law has ac-
cepted the concession theory of corporate personality, and the
grim shadow of ultra vires has fallen athwart the pathway of
our needs. "The public," Lord Bramwell has told us, 1'0 "is
entitled to keep a registered company to its registered business,"
and so a company may not go beyond the powers that have been
conferred upon it in its origin. But the public had to be pro-
tected from the consequences of corporate enterprise, and the
nineteenth century has gradually seen the extension to it of the
principles of individual liability. It is so difficult, for instance,
for a single individual to run a railway, that it would be intoler-
able if the mere problem of numbers prevented the attainment
of justice. So trover, 0 6 trespass, 0 T and nuisance0 8 had all
been successfully pled against the corporate person before the
first half of the century had passed. Malicious prosecution,
10 9
libel,"" fraud,"' and false imprisonment" 2 were little by little
compelled to follow.
The hesitations that have been charactristic of our policy lie
at the door of our conception of the corporation. So long as
we think of it as a fiction created only for certain ends which
are legal, the doctrine of implied authority logically prevents us
from admitting, that it can be guilty of authorizing illegal acts.
113
Having made it mindless, we are unwilling to admit it guilty of
acts which seem to carry with them the stamp of conscious
immorality. Bitt immediately we surrender so inadequate a
theory, the ground for the extension of vicarious liability to
the corporate person is very clear. It acts and is acted for; it
must then pay the penalty for its habits. In a world where indi-
vidual enterprise is so largely replaced, the security of business
relationships would be enormously impaired unless we had the
105 A. G. v. G. E. Ry. Co. (1879) iI Ch. D. 449, 503. Cf. 29 HAiv. L.
REV. 405 f.
108 Smith v. Birmingham Gas. Co. (1834) i A. & E. 526.
'oT Maund v. Monmouthshire Canal Co. (1840) 4 M. & W. 452.
108R. v. G. N. R. Co. (1846) 9 Q. B. 315.
lo9 Citizens' Life Ass. Co. v. Brown [19o4] A. C. 423, 436.
110 Whitefield v. S. E. R. Co. (i858) 27 L. J. (Q. B.) 229.
"'IBarwick v. Eng. Joint Stock Bank, ut supra.
112 Eastern Counties Ry. Co. v. Brown (1867) L. R. 2 Ex. 259.
113 This seems to be Mr. Baty's view. Op. cit. p. 69 ff.
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means of preventing a company from repudiating its servants'
torts. 14 The reason is not that companies are well able to pay;
for it is not the business of law to see that a debtor is solvent,
but to provide a remedy for admitted wrong.
The enforcement of such vicarious liability is more urgent
for another reason. The dissolution of individual business enter-
prise into the corporation system has tended to harden the con-
ditions of commercial life. The impersonality of a company
employing say five thousand men is perhaps inevitable; but in
its methods of operation, it tends to be less careful of human
life, more socially wasteful than the individual has been."05
But its consequences to society are equally momentous, and we
dare not judge it differently.1 ' It is necessary, for instance, to
see to it that we have pure food and unadulterated milk, and it
can make no difference to us whether the offender against our
requirements be individual or corporate.117  It is only by enforc-
ing vicarious liability that we can hope to make effective those
labor laws intended to promote the welfare of the workers ;118
for it is too frequently the corporation that evades the statute
or attempts to discredit it."9  It is useless to argue that the
responsibility rests upon the agent; for it is unfortunately too
clear that men may act very differently in their institutional
relations than in their ordinary mode of life.120  The London
Dock strike of 1911 suggested that a man who in his domestic
capacity will display all the most amiable sentiments of an
114 Cf. Gierke, Die Genossenschafts Theorie und die Deutsche Recht-
sprechung, 801-3, and especially Loening, Die Haftung das Staates, p. 89.
See also Pollock, op. cit. at p. I27.
"25 For an interesting suggestion that it should therefore be judged dif-
ferently, see M. D. Petre, Life of G. Tyrrell, II, 482.
116 Cf. C. D. Burns, The Morality of Nations, chaps. i and xi.
17 Pearks etc. v. Ward [1902] 2 K. B. I, and Chuter v. French [I91I]
2 K. B. 832; Stranahan Bros. Catering Co. v. Coit (i897) 55 Oh. St. 398-
a very striking case.
"28 Ruegg, Law of Employer and Workman in England, Lect. iv.
'19 Anyone who studies the REPORTS OF THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF FAC-
TORIES IN ENGLAND, or the BULLETINS OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR, especially
No. 142 of 1914, which deal with the enforcement of legislation, will be
impressed by this state of affairs. For statistics as to the part played
by the great corporations in the extension of the Fourteenth Amendment
to labor legislation, see Collins, The Fourteenth Amendment and the
States.
120 See an interesting little essay by Father Tyrrell on the corporate
mind in his Through Scylla and Charybdis.
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average retired grocer will, when acting for a great dock com-
pany, show himself immovable and unrelenting. But if he in-
jure society in his activities it is surely clear that means must
be at hand to render his principal responsible. That, at any
rate, was the basis of the great judgment of Farwell, J., in the
Taff Vale case. 2 1  No one supposes that trade union officials
will commit torts unless there a-e trade unions for which to
commit them. There may be special reasons for taking the
trade unions outside the ordinary law, 22 but that is not to say
that the acts would not otherwise be corporately tortious in char-
acter. No one can deny, for example, the reality of those entities
we call England and Germany. Not only do they act, but persons
act on their behalf. It seems then socially necessary to make
them bear the burden of a policy for which they are at bottom
responsible. 23
Nor is the case at all different when the association we attempt
to make corporately liable happens not to have chosen the path
of incorporation. There seems no reason in the world why a
technicality of registration should be allowed to differentiate
between societies not in essence distinct. Yet as the law now
stands active participation is essential to such liability."24  Here
contract has betrayed us; for we regard the voluntary asso-
ciation as no more than a chance collection of individuals who
have agreed to perform certain acts; and they could not, of
course, assent to the commission of illegalities." 25  "Because,"
says Mr. Baty,126 "William Sikes is a bad man, Lady Florence
Belgrave is not to be taxed with abetting burglary if she sends
him soup." But it is not the soup to which anyone-except Mr.
Sikes and the philosophers of the London Charity Organization
Society-will object; the problem is as to the establishment by
Mr. Sikes of a fund which, though subscribed for legal pur-
poses, is yet used in an illegal manner.1 27 N one really desires
to attack the private fortunes of associated individuals; but it
121 [i9oi] A. C. 426.
22 See Mr. and Mrs. Webb's remarks in their introduction to the 1911
edition of their History of Trade Unionism.
"2 See 13 JouR. OF PHIL. PsYcH. & Sc. METHODS, p. 85
14Brown v. Lewis (i896) 12 T. L. R. 455.
"25 Cf. 29 HARv. L. REV. 417 ff.
126 Baty, op. cit. 52.
127 As for instance, the money subscribed to arm the different volunteer
armies in Ireland recently.
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is eminently desirable that means should be had of getting at
the funds they collectively subscribe, when legal--or illegal-
results flow from their collective action. If a religious order
which has not been incorporated chooses to have the services
of an architect, the mere fact that its members are scattered,
and had never contemplated the use made of their subscriptions
by their representatives, ought not to hinder the architect from
securing his rights by a representative action.12  If an unincor-
porate aggregate acts as an individual body, it is surely good
sense, it ought no less surely to be good law, to give it bodili-
ness.129  That is why one can sympathize with decisions such as
that in Ellis v. National Free Labor Association,13
0 or, conversely,
with that in Brown v. Thompson and Co."' The same is true of
the liability of clubs acting through their committees. No one
imagines that the committee of a football club would, as a group
of respectable and individual householders, erect a grand stand;
and if that stand collapses, a technicality of registration ought
not to defeat the ends of justice.13 2  An unincorporate individual
is an unity for the fiscal purposes of the state;1'3 it is difficult to
see why its social needs should be refused a similar protection.
VI
The basis of modem legislation on employer's liability and
workmen's compensation is very similar in character. Both
represent the typical modem reaction against mid-Victorian indi-
vidualism. It is interesting to note the somewhat curious diver-
gence in the attitude of lawyers and economists to these prob-
lems. To the economist, the necessity of such legislation is
abundantly evident. It is simply that the needs of the modem
state require that the burden of loss of life, or personal injury
in industry, shall be charged to the expenses of production, shall
118 Walker v. Sur [1914] 2 K. B. 930.
129 See, for instance, the amazing remarks of Lord Halsbury in Daimler
Co. v. Continental Tyre Co. [I916] 2 A. C. 307 at p. 316. Maitland might
never have written so far as this view of the nature of a corporation is
concerned.
130 [1905] 7 Fac. 629.
131 [1912] S. C. 358.
132Brown v. Lewis, ut supra, and see also Wise v. Perpetual Trustee Co.
[19o3] A. C. i39.
13348 & 49 Vict. c. 51; Curtis v. Old Monkland Conservative Association
[igo6] A. C. 86.
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be borne, that is to say, by the employer.134  He knows well
enough that eventually the cost will be paid by the community
in the form of increased prices, but that is something it is not
unwilling to pay. It is realized that if a workman is compelled
to take upon himself all the risks of his employment, the results
will be socially disastrous. For the real social unit at the present
time is not the individual but the family. It is not merely the
single worker who is employed; his wages in reality represent
the maintenance of those who are dependent upon him. From
the standpoint of public policy, therefore, for the employer to
assert that risk must lie where it falls is simply impossible. We
cannot allow the certificated managers of collieries to kill their
miners with impunity." 5 If the carelessness of a porter breaks
a scaffolding upon which a carpenter is standing, his family
ought not to starve through his injury. 38  The need of the
modern state is most emphatically that the welfare of the workers
should be the first charge upon industry.
37
But the law has approached the problem from so entirely dif-
ferent an angle as to place the workman in a peculiarly unfor-
tunate position until a fairly recent time. It was considered
essential that when a servant undertook employment he should
accept all the risks of service. To do otherwise, said Abinger,
C. J.,1s8 "would be an encouragement to the servant to omit that
diligence and caution which he is in duty bound to exercise on
behalf of his master." There is a long history behind the enun-
ciation of that pathetic self-reliance; though as a legal fact
Lord Esher has told us that it became good-or bad-law "prin-
cipally through the ingenuity of Lord Abinger in suggesting
analogies in Priestley v. Fowler."'39 As a fact it was grounded
uLOn a series of most questionable hypotheses. There could not
234 For characteristic economic opinion, see Seager, Principles of Eco-
nomics, p. 6oi; Taussig, 2 Principles of Economics, 334; 2 Chapman,
Work and Wages, 4oi; Schaffle, Theory of Labor Protection, xiii;
Carlton, History of the Problems of Organized Labor, p. 304; Seager,
Social Insurance, passim; Eastman, Work Accidents and the Law;
Barlow in 7 EcoNomIc JouR., 345; and II, ibid. 354; Willoughby, Work-
ingmen's Insurance, p. 327; and above all, the classic eleventh chapter in
Webb, Industrial Democracy, especially Vol. II, pp. 387-91.
23 5Howells v. Landore Siemens Steel Co. (1874) L. R. io Q. B. 62.
138 Morgan v. Vale of Neath Ry. Co. (1865) L. R. i Q. B. 149.
'37 This point is well worked out in Mr. Hobson's Work and Wealth.
188 Priestley v. Fowler (1837) 3 M. & W. I at p. 7.
139 Birrell, Law of Employer's Liability, p. 25.
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be, so the law held, where master and servant are concerned, any
mutual liability not based on a personal fault of the former,
since the servant knowingly and willingly undertook the risks
of service. But this is not only the merest fiction of a peculiarly
vicious kind. It created also one law of negligence for strangers
and another, far less stringent, where masters were concerned.1 -4
The results involved were patently unjust and discriminated
unduly; and it was natural that the first efforts of the trade-
unions after their legal recognition should have been devoted
to the destruction of the fellow-servant doctrine.14 1  This, after
much effort, they were able to accomplish in England by the
Employers' Liability Act of i88o.'4 Judicial interpretation has
moreover explained that, in this context, the maxim volendi -non
fit iniuria ought to mean in reality just nothing at all. 4 3 The
work thus admirably begun was supplemented and completed
in the Workmen's Compensation Acts of 1897 and 19o6. The
effect of that legislation is perfectly clear. In certain specified
cases it imposes upon the employer the liability of providing
compensation to a workman or the dependents of a workman who
is either killed or injured in the course of his employment. It
is noteworthy that this method of social insurance is not confined
to England alone but, in some form or other, is common to the
continent of Europe.'44
In this country, however, much of the old legal attitude has
survived, and the situation has become complicated by problems
of constitutional interpretation.'4  Such statutes, says Judge
Smith, 40 "are in direct conflict with the fundamental rule of
modern common law as to the ordinary requisites of a tort"; and
he points out that the modern conception is really akin to the
mediaevalism which apportioned blame irrespective of motive.
140 Cf. Webb, History of Trade Unionism, p. 350.
'14 The sequence Reform Act 1867, Trade Union Acts 1871-6, Employers'
Liability Act i88o is surely very significant; see Webb, loc. cit.
142 43 & 44 Vcit. c. 42.
143 Smith v. Baker [1891] A. C. 325.
14 Mr. A. P. Higgins in his Law of Employers' Liability has discussed
the continental attitude.
1
45 Mechem in 44 AM. L. REv. 221, and Smith in 27 HARv. L. REv. 235,
344, are very typical of this. Cf. the weighty remarks of Freund in ig
GREEN BAG So, and 2 AM. LAB. LEG. REv. 43; and of Lewis in 38 ANN.
AM. AcAB. POL. Sc. II9. See also the remarkable judgment in Ives v.
So. Buffalo Ry. Co. (1gl1) 2O N. Y. 271.
146 27 HARv. L. REv. 238.
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But it may be questioned whether the statutes were ever intended
to throw any light upon the theory of torts. That at which they
aim is simply, for social reasons, to secure the worker against
the dangers of his employment in the belief that it is more
advantageous for the burden to fall upon the employer. 147  It
does not base that burden upon tort at all. On the contrary
it withdraws it from the ordinary concepts of law by making it
statutory. It places a statutory clause-the provision, in certain
cases, for accident-as one of the conditions a master must
observe if he wishes to engage in business. 14 The liability is
made to arise not from any tort upon the part of the master,
but upon the inherent nature of the modern economic situation. 1 4
It is not claimed that the master ought to pay because he gets
the benefit of his servants' work,150 any more than under the old
doctrine of common employment the judges would have argued
that the workers ought to pay because they had the privilege of
being employed.
The fact is that eighty years have passed since Priestley v.
Fowler, and our social ideas have not stood still in that interval.
The state has been brought to ask itself how the safety of the
workers and their families may be best assured, and it has re-
turned its answer. It is unnecessary to attempt to bring the
theory under any of the old maxims of vicarious liability.'5 '
The dogma underlying it may be new or it may be old; we need
not be greatly concerned either at its novelty or its antiquity.
The question to which we have to reply is a very different one.
The test of our rule is whether it affords the protection that is
intended. Much of the real problem is obscured 'by discussion
of a supposititious case of an individual employer and a free
and independent workman-without real existence in the indus-
trial world we know-and then asking, if the former is to be
responsible for accidents where no fault is anywhere to be dis-
covered, and if the logic of the law of torts is thereby to be
destroyed. We cannot sacrifice social necessity to the logic of
147 For more drastically adverse criticism of the principle see Mignault
in 44 Am. L. REv. 719; Hirschfeld in 13 JouR. Soc. Com. LEG. ri9; and
seemingly, Prof. Dicey in Law and Public Opinion, pp. 281-2; cf. Holmes,
J., in 207 U. S. 463, 541.
148 Cf. Pound, 25 INT. JouR. oF ETHIcs, p. I.
149 Just as special liabilities are attached to carriers, etc.
150 As Prof. Mechem seems to think, op. cit. 227, 241-2.
1- As Judge Smith is anxious to compel us to do. 27 -ARv. L. REv. 254.
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the law of torts. The crux of this problem is the economic need
of preventing the cheapening of human life,'
1 52 and to that end
our law must shape itself. We need not fear very greatly that
the imposition of such liability on building contractors, for ex-
ample, will force them out of business ;153 for the cost of labor
has a convenient habit of expressing itself in terms of price.
Nor can we rest content with the suggestion of a distinguished
jurist 54 that it is expedient to let accidental loss lie where it
falls. That may be an admirable maxim in the case of a
stricken millionaire; but it is of too hard consequence where the
sufferer has needy dependents.
It seems, on the whole, a better policy to set our faces firmly
forward, and shape the character of our law by the ends it has
to serve. In such an aspect, if we admit that the state has the
right, on grounds of public policy, to condition the industrial
process, it becomes apparent that the basis of the vicarious lia-
bility is not tortious at all; nor, since it is withdrawn from the
area of agreement, is it contractual. It is simply a statutory
protection the state chooses to offer its workers. Whether, as
such, it so discriminates against the employing class, as to come
within the scope of measures contemplated by the Fourteenth
Amendment, is another and a very different question. If we
believe that it is not an infringement of libery to read its mean-
ing in its social context, 55 we shall perhaps be in no doubt
as to the rightness of a negative response. We shall then argue
that no other possibility in reality exists at the present time.
We have to minimize the loss consequent upon the needs of life.
The principles of law must be subordinate to that effort.
VII
There seems no valid a priori reason why the operation of our
principles should cease at that border where tort becomes crime.
Actus non facit reum nisi menw rea may be admirable in a state
of nature; but it will not fit the facts of a complex social struc-
ture. So that we need fear no difficulties at the outset. The
case is of course obvious where the crime is performed upon
152 Cf. Hutchins & Harrison, History of Factory Legislation, 254 f.
253 Quinn v. Crimmings (1898) 71 Mass. 255, 258.
1'5 Holmes, The Common Law, 94 if.
5t 3 Green, Coll. Works, 379.
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specific authority, 5 or is the natural and inevitable consequence
of the servant's business. 5 7  The real problems, as in the case
of civil liability, arise where the doctrine of implied authority
begins to pale its ineffectual fire before the difficulties it has to
confront.
Everything, it is clear, depends upon the nature of the crime.
We shall not easily, for instance, charge a corporation with
murder; but if a company's servants, acting for their master's
benefit, send a gatling gun mounted upon an armored train
through a village at night, 58 it is necessary to enforce adequate
penalties against the source of such a crime. Again, we have
statutes regulating the sale of liquor which are notoriously diffiL
cult to enforce. It is found essential, in these cases, to insist
on the full responsibility of the licensee if the law is to be of
any avail." 9 Lord Alverstone, indeed, has endeavored to formu-
late certain canons by which the breach of law may be tested;'10
but they can hardly be said to have much practical worth. The
point at issue in this class of crime is simply and surely the
enforcement of the law, and it may generally be suggested that
the necessities of the case do not admit of our enquiring too
closely into the delicate niceties of the situation.' 6  Society has
not usually suffered from a reasonable vigilance towards saloon
keepers. And the same rule holds good when we pass the narrow
line from drink to cards.'
82
We must have our food protected; and that, irrespective of
the vendor's motive. It is here not merely a question of whether
knowledge on the master's part may be assumed,8 3 or whether
the provision of food is so dangerous an occupation as to require
special diligence,8 4 but simply that the consequences of the alter-
native to a stern treatment are too serious to be admissible.
158 U. S. v. Nunnemacher (1876) 7 Biss. iii.
' 5 7 As in the case of a bookseller's assistant dealing with a libellous
publication. Wilson zr Rankin (1865) 6 B. & S. 208, per Cockburn, C. J.
258 Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, p. 8o.
15 State v. Fagan (1909) 74 At. (Del.) 693.
180 Emory v. Nolloth [19o3] 2 K. B. 264.
161 Cf. however, Com. v. Riley (i9o7) 196 Mass. 6o.
182 Crabtree v. cole (1879) 43 J. P. 779; Bond v. Evans (1888) 23
Q. B. D. 249. The remarks of Stephen, J., on the strange decision in
Newman v. Jones (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 132 are particularly noteworthy.
183 Nelson v. Parkhill (1892) 20 Sc. Sess. Cas. 4th Series, p. 24; Brown
v. Foot (1892) 66 L. T. N. S. 649.
16
4 R. v. Dixon (814) 3 M. & S. II.
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Arguments as to the reality of a corporate mind'
65 pale into
insignificance before the problem of public health. We are, here,
beyond the stage where it is sufficient to know that reasonable
care was exercised. It is essentially the consequences of action
with which we have to deal,""" for where public policy has such
vital ends to serve it cannot rest content with the easy fatalism
of good intention.'8 7  We dare not risk the nullification of our
needs. We authorize the master to sell in set fashion, and if
the law is broken he must take the consequences.
16 Cases such
as these must clearly stand upon a special footing. "Where the
statute," says the court in an Irish case,
1 9 "creates a direct and
unqualified duty, the person obliged to perform the duty cannot
escape under the doctrine of mens rea." Protection were other-
wise an impossible task.
Parallel with such a situation is the law in regard to libel.
It has been long and well settled that a master-in the absence
of statutes to the contrary-is responsible for the criminal libels
committed by his servant without his knowledge or consent.1
70
Those who have the control of books and newspapers in their
hands have a weapon too powerful to bear no more responsibility
tha nthat of guilty intent. It is not merely, as Tenterden, C. J.,
argued, that the proprietor of a bookshop or of a newspaper
ought to pay because he enjoys the profits of the enterprise,'
71
the fact is, that damage by publication is very largely an irre-
parable damage, 72 and that the law must protect the interests of
personality as best it may.'
73
Nor ought the corporation to avoid responsibility on the ground
165 Pearks v. Wood [1902] 2 K. B. i; Chuter v. Freeth [1911] 2 K. B. 832.
166 Cf. however, Kearley v. Taylor (18gi) 65 L. T. N. S. 261 for a
case where distinct disobedience to express orders was held an admissible
defence.
167 See the judgment in Hosford v. Mackey [1897] 2 Ir. 292; Lehman
v. Dist. of Columbia (19o2) i App. D. C. 217.
18 See the very able judgment in State v. Kettelle (1892) 11o N. C. 56o,
and that in Com. v. Savery (1887) 145 Mass. 212.
189 Fitzgerald v. Hosford (19oo) 2 Ir. Rep. 391. Cf. the judgment of
Channell, J., in Anglo-American Oil Co. v. Manning [i9o8] i K. B. 536.
1"0R. v. Williams (1774) Lofft, 759; R. v. Topham (1791) 4 T. R. 126;
R. v. Alexander (1829) Mood. & M. 437.
171 As is well shown in the Mylius case.
172R. v. Gutch (1829) Mood. & M. 433.
173 The limitation of 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96 should be noted.
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that it is mindless.714 Such a view has long been regarded as
untenable. No one would dream of accusing a corporation of
adultery, but there are offenses clearly to be attributed to it where
the act is directly performed by its servants. "We think,"
said a strong court,17 5 "that a corporation may be criminally
liable for certain offences of which a specific intent may be a
necessary element. There is no more difficulty in imputing to a
corporation a specific intent in criminal proceedings than in civil.
A corporation cannot be arrested and imprisoned in either civil
or criminal proceedings; but its property may be taken either in
compensation for a private wrong, or as punishment for a public
wrong." Those people would agree that common sense is on
the side of such an attitude. It would be intolerable if corporate
enterprise did not imply corporate responsibility. It is the de-
termining factor in the action of the servants who commit the
crime on its behalf; so, in a long series of cases, the rule has
been extended from the analogy of the individual. 7 6  We have
not yet, indeed, been able to make criminal negligence extend
to the point of manslaughter ;177 though perhaps it may be sug-
gested that with the admission by an Australian court of cor-
porate mens rea, 7 8 there are real possibilities of progress. It
is not until we have admitted the necessity of completely equating
group-action with individual action in its social aspects that we
can remain content. It is, indeed, a happy augury, that this line
of thought should have been declared constitutional by the
Supreme Court of the United States. 7 9  It is difficult to take
very seriously the plea of Mr. Baty, that "even if the results
of summary process are not very serious, they involve in the
minds of ignorant persons a certain amount of discredit."'8 0
Law is not made to suit the wrong notions of ignorant persons.
The real problem is simply whether we dare afford to lose such
'74 Holt, C. J., in 12 Mod. 559 (702); State v. Great Works Milling
& Mfg. Co. (1841) 20 Me. 41.
175 Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth (1899) 172 Mass. 294.
176 Misfeasance in R. v. Brim. & G. Ry. Co. (1842) 3 Q. B. 223; ob-
struction in R. v. G. N. Ry. Co. (1846) 9 Q. B. 315; under the Lotteries
Act in Hawke v. Hulton [i9o9] 2 K. B. 93 are typical examples.
177 R. v. G. W. Laundry Co. (i9oo) i3 Manitoba, 66; Union Colliery Co.
v. Queen (1900) 31 Can. Sup. Ct. 81.
178 R. v. Panton, 14 Vict. L. Rep. 936.
279 N. Y. C. & H. Ry. Co. v. U. S. (19o8) 212 U. S. 481.
180 Baty, op. cit. 219.
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hold as we possess over the action of groups in the affairs of
social life-the more particularly in an age predominantly asso-
ciational in character.""' It is, for the most part, a commercial
problem consequent upon the dissolution of individual industrial
action.'"" Its solution in the future must depend upon our man-
ner of interpreting the business function.' 8'
VIII
What has been here attempted is, in fact, a part of the socio-
logical analysis of law. We do not sufficiently realize how
greatly our legal ideas have been affected by their peculiar rela-
tion to the history of landed property. Primitive jurisprudence
concerns itself, for the most part, with the protection of indi-
vidual rights. Certain men are blameworthy; they have invaded
the property of other men. It is then necessary to obtain pro-
tection against them. That ancient but tenacious individualism
is in truth the coronation of anarchy; and the time comes when
a spirit of community supersedes it. But either because that
notion is prematurely born, or else because it is inadequately
translated into terms of actual life, it results in the cramping
of single-handed effort. It passes away; and the consequence
is the beatification of laissez-faire. But it becomes increasingly
evident that society cannot be governed on the principles of com-
mercial nihilism. To assume that freedom and equality consist
in unlimited competition is simply to travesty the facts. We
come once more to an age of collective endeavor. We begin the
re-interpretation of law in the terms of our collective needs.
Novelty for our principles, we may not in some sort deny;
though, in truth, if it is by history that we are to be judged a
plethora of antiquarianism might not be wanting'8 4 But it is
on different ground that we take our stand. It is our business
to set law to the rhythm of modern life. It is the harmonization
181 This is especially true of the United States. Cf. De Tocqueville's
remarks in 2 Democ. in America, 97 ff. (trans. Reeve, 1889) which are
even more accurate at the present time.
182 Perhaps also of great ecclesiastical corporations, cf. Brown v. Mon-
treal (1874) 6 P. C. 157. Something of the same issue is involved in First
Church of Christ Scientist, Applic. of (1897) 6 Pa. Dist. Ct. 745, and the
similar application in 205 Pa. 543.
183 Cf. Mr. Justice Brandeis in his Business a Profession, passim.
184 Cf. the articles of Dean Wigmore cited above.
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of warring interests with which we are concerned. How to
evolve from a seeming conflict the social gain it is the endeavor
of law to promote-this is the problem by which we are con-
fronted. We would base our legal decisions not on the facts
of yesterday, but on the possibilities of to-morrow. We would
seek the welfare of society in the principles we enunciate. We
have been told on the highest authority that no other matter is
entitled to be weighed.185
HAROLD J. LASKI.
Harvard University.
185 Holmes, J., in 8 H~Av. L. REv. 9.
